

LEE TUCKER

270 Bay State Rd., Room 543
Boston University, Department of Economics
Boston MA 02215 USA
Cell: (607) 351-5427
Fax: (617) 353-4449
Email: tuckerl@bu.edu
Web site: <http://leetucker.net/>

EDUCATION

Ph.D., Economics, Boston University, Boston MA, May 2018 (expected)
Dissertation Title: *Three Essays on Labor Markets*
Dissertation Committee: Daniele Paserman, Johannes Schmieder and Samuel Bazzi

B.A., Economics (*Magna Cum Laude*)
Carleton College, Northfield, MN, 2006

FIELDS OF INTEREST

Labor Economics, Development Economics, Applied Microeconomics, Urban Economics

WORKING PAPERS

“Monopsony for Whom? Evidence from Brazilian Administrative Data,” September 2017 (job market paper, [latest version](#)).

“The Division of Labor and the Labor Market: Are Specialized Worker Skillsets Valued?” October 2016.

“The Impact of Having a Job at Migration on Settlement Decisions: Ethnic Enclaves as Job Search Networks,” October 2014.

WORK IN PROGRESS

“Circling the Wagons: Do Immigrants Agglomerate in Response to Economic Shocks?” (with Samuel Bazzi)

“Migration in Multi-period Citizen Candidate Voting Models” (with Ben Solow)

FELLOWSHIPS AND AWARDS

Special Research Fellowship, Boston University, 2013-2015
Teaching Fellowship, Boston University, 2012, 2014-2016

WORK EXPERIENCE

Research Assistant for Johannes Schmieder, Boston University, 2016-2017
Research Assistant for Samuel Bazzi, Boston University, 2013-2015
Staff Economist, White House Council of Economic Advisers, 2012-2013
Senior Analyst, Analysis Group, Washington, DC, 2006-2010

TEACHING EXPERIENCE

Instructor, Economics of the Labor Market, Department of Economics, Boston University, Fall 2017, Summer 2015, Summer 2014
Instructor, Economics of Poverty and Discrimination in the United States, Department of Economics, Boston University, Summer 2016
Teaching Fellow, Introductory Microeconomic Analysis, Department of Economics, Boston University, Spring 2016, Fall 2015, Fall 2014
Teaching Fellow, Introductory Macroeconomic Analysis, Department of Economics, Boston University, Spring 2012

CLEARANCE: Single-scope background investigation completed January 2013; TS Eligible through January 2018.

PROFESSIONAL SERVICE:

Boston University Economics Graduate Peer Advisor, 2014-2017
Webmaster for Theoretical Research in Development Economics (ThReD), 2013-2016
Organizing Assistant for NEUDC Conference, Fall 2014
Organizing Assistant for ThReD Conferences, 2015-2016

COMPUTER SKILLS: Stata, Python, ArcGIS, SAS, SQL, VBA, HTML, JavaScript, LaTeX

CITIZENSHIP: USA

REFERENCES**Professor Daniele Paserman**

Department of Economics
Boston University
Phone: (617) 353-5695
Email: paserman@bu.edu

Associate Professor Johannes Schmieder

Department of Economics
Boston University
Phone: (617) 358-5923
Email: johannes@bu.edu

Assistant Professor Samuel Bazzi

Department of Economics
Boston University
Phone: (617) 353-6150
Email: sbazzi@bu.edu

LEE TUCKER

Monopsony for Whom? Evidence from Brazilian Administrative Data (job market paper, [latest version](#))

Recent interest in inter-firm wage differentials has led to a renewed debate regarding the extent of monopsony in labor markets. However, the recent empirical analysis on this topic has been split; studies of job separation activity suggest that firms hold high degrees of monopsony power, while studies of hiring activity provide little evidence for monopsony and are generally faced with simultaneity concerns. I leverage uniquely well-suited employer-employee matched administrative data from Brazil to study this discrepancy, looking both at whether firms offer higher wages to their new employees at the times when they are growing more rapidly, and the extent to which workers' voluntary separation decisions depend on their own wage. The comprehensiveness of the data allow me to address simultaneity concerns through two novel "shift-share" style instruments, as well as the inclusion of local labor market fixed effects. Although my results provide clear evidence that labor markets are imperfect even at hiring, they also strongly suggest that firms hold comparatively little monopsony power over their new hires as compared to their existing workers. I discuss the implications of several models that can potentially explain these results.

The Division of Labor and the Labor Market: Are Specialized Skillsets Valued?

Why are there gains from specialization in production? One plausible mechanism is that when workers are no longer required to invest in broad skillsets, they are able to develop their skills more deeply, and in doing so become more productive. A standard model of specialization in the style of Becker and Murphy (1992) suggests two key testable predictions that have received little empirical scrutiny: that highly-skilled individuals will develop more specialized skillsets and be compensated for them, and that more technologically-advanced firms will hire more specialized workers. To test these predictions, I construct occupation-level measures of skill specialization using the U.S. O*NET database and a hierarchical clustering algorithm from the machine learning literature, and I then map these skill measures to rich matched employee-employer administrative data from Brazil. Specialization among production skills is shown to be valuable, and evidence also suggests that workers who are specialized in production skills sort into higher-wage firms. In contrast, specialization in one's cognitive skills does not predict higher wages, and workers with less specialized cognitive skillsets sort into higher-wage firms. These findings yield new implications for future research on specialization in the labor market.

The Impact of Having a Job at Migration on Settlement Decisions: Ethnic Enclaves as Job Search Networks

Observational evidence has shown that immigrants who choose to locate in enclaves have worse post-migration outcomes than those who locate elsewhere. This suggests that immigrants may be negatively selected into enclaves based on their ability to assimilate or to avoid discrimination. I hypothesize, however, that new immigrants choose to locate in enclaves in part based on their ability to benefit from the pre-existing labor market networks that these enclaves provide. Using detailed survey data from the New Immigrant Survey, I show that immigrants who arrive without job offers are significantly more likely to locate in enclaves, even after accounting for a wide range of pre-migration and time-invariant characteristics. However, I do not find significant evidence of heterogeneous effects of a job offer. This suggests that highly-skilled individuals and low-skilled individuals may benefit similarly from the job search benefits of locating in enclaves.